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We consider a setting where the rm sells a main service (e.g., air travel) and an ancillary service (e.g.,
baggage delivery) to two types of consumers (e.g., business travelers and leisure travelers). We study how
the rm's ability to charge discriminatory main service prices aects its decision of whether to unbundle the
ancillary service from the main service and charge separate prices. Unlike a rm using uniform pricing of main
service that unbundles the ancillary service if the consumers that value the main service higher have a high
likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service, a rm using discriminatory pricing of main service unbundles
the ancillary service if the consumers that value the main service higher have a low likelihood of purchasing
the ancillary service. Moreover, discriminatory pricing of main service makes unbundling more (less) likely
to be the optimal ancillary service strategy when consumers' main service valuations and ancillary service
valuations are negatively (positively) correlated. Finally, we characterize how rms' use of main service price
discrimination and consumers' valuation structure (i.e., whether the correlation between consumers' main
service valuations and ancillary service valuations is positive or negative) jointly determine the ancillary
service strategies in an industry.
1. Introduction
Many rms provide an ancillary service in addition to a main service to enhance the expe-
rience of consumers. When taking a ight, consumers may need to transport bags or have
a meal during the ight. When staying at a hotel, consumers may need to have break-
fast or use internet connection. In many service industries such as travel, consumers book
the main service in advance, at which time they may be uncertain about their valuations
for the ancillary service. As the travel time approaches, valuation uncertainty is resolved.
Consumer valuations for the ancillary service are heterogeneous, indeed some consumers
may not need the ancillary service at all.
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Even in the same industry, rms adopt dierent strategies regarding whether to unbundle
the same type of ancillary service. For example, while many airlines have unbundled the
checked baggage service, Southwest Airlines oers the rst two checked bags for free,
meaning that the baggage fee is built into the ticket price. The tradeo that a rm faces
regarding unbundling the ancillary service is as follows. On the one hand, by unbundling the
ancillary service, the rm gains additional exibility from being able to charge a separate
price for the ancillary service and extracts more consumer surplus. On the other hand,
it incurs inconvenience costs by unbundling the ancillary service, which may include the
additional labor cost to process the ancillary service payments, the cost of congestion (e.g.,
if an airline has to process the payments for carry-on bags at the gate, its ights could
be easily delayed, resulting in an undesirable on-time performance record), and loss of
consumer goodwill from having to pay for the ancillary service.
In this paper, we consider a rm that sells a main service and an ancillary service to two
types of consumers (e.g., business travelers and leisure travelers). We rst study the optimal
ancillary service strategy for a rm that does not price-discriminate when selling the main
service, i.e., the rm charges a uniform main service price to both consumer types. Note
that under the commodity bundling setting, for each product type, the rm also charges
the same price to all consumers. The dierence between ancillary service unbundling and
commodity bundling is that a consumer cannot purchase or use the ancillary service if
she has not purchased the main service, whereas in commodity bundling products can be
purchased separately. Despite the dierence, if the rm charges a uniform service price
to both consumer types, we nd consistent results with the commodity bundling litera-
ture regarding the conditions for unbundling to be optimal. These results would indicate
that airlines with lower percentages of business travelers such as Southwest should be
more likely to unbundle checked baggage service than airlines with higher percentages of
business travelers such as Delta (Section 4 provides the detailed analysis). This is clearly
inconsistent with the airline industry practice. Although uniform pricing of main service
is common in some other industries (e.g., many hotels, especially economy hotels, do not
charge dierent room rates to dierent consumers), it is common airline practice to charge
business travelers, who usually book tickets closer to the travel date and have a higher
willingness to pay, a higher price than leisure travelers, who usually book tickets well in
advance and have a lower willingness to pay. Therefore, we study the optimal ancillary
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service strategy for a rm that can price-discriminate when selling the main service, that
is, the rm charges dierent main service prices to dierent consumer types (Section 5).
We develop insights about how the rm's ability to price-discriminate when selling the
main service aects its optimal ancillary service strategy (Section 6). Since the extent to
which main service price discrimination is used diers across industries, studying both the
rms using uniform pricing of main service and the rms using discriminatory pricing of
main service generate insights for multiple industries.
We nd that whether the rm uses discriminatory pricing of main service or not signif-
icantly changes the optimal strategy for ancillary services. For a uniform-pricing rm, it
is optimal to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers that value the main service
higher have a high enough likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service. This indicates
that for unbundling to be the optimal strategy for the ancillary service, the correlation
between consumers' valuations for the main service and their valuations for the ancillary
service needs to be positive enough, which is consistent with the ndings of the commodity
bundling literature (Adams and Yellen 1976, McAfee et al. 1989, and Schmalensee 1984).
However, for a discriminatory-pricing rm, it is optimal to unbundle the ancillary service if
the consumers that value the main service higher have a low enough likelihood of purchas-
ing the ancillary service. Thus, the optimality condition for unbundling does not depend on
the consumer valuation correlation, and the ndings of the commodity bundling literature
no longer hold. Moreover, by comparing the uniform-pricing case and the discriminatory-
pricing case directly, we nd that compared to a uniform-pricing rm, unbundling is more
(less) likely to be the optimal strategy for a price-discriminating rm if consumers' valua-
tions for the main service and the ancillary service are negatively (positively) correlated.
This result indicates that as a rm starts to adopt price discrimination for the main ser-
vice, the optimal ancillary service strategy may be changed, and the key determinant is
consumers' valuation structure. Finally, if rms use discriminatory pricing of main service,
the way that the consumer valuation structure aects the dierentiation of optimal ancil-
lary service strategies across rms is reversed from the case of uniform pricing. In the case
of uniform pricing, if consumers' valuations for the main service and the ancillary service
are positively (negatively) correlated, unbundling is more (less) likely to be the optimal
ancillary service strategy for rms with higher proportions of high-type consumers. The
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result is exactly the opposite in the case of discriminatory pricing, i.e., if consumers' valu-
ations for the main service and the ancillary service are negatively (positively) correlated,
unbundling is more (less) likely to be the optimal ancillary service strategy for rms with
higher proportions of high-type consumers.
Therefore, the structure of rms' optimal ancillary service strategies in an industry
is jointly determined by rms' use of main service price discrimination and consumers'
valuation structure. This provides insights for ancillary service strategies across dierent
industries. For example, breakfast service is among the most common ancillary services
oered by hotels. Business travelers would be more likely to eat at the hotel and pay for
it, while leisure travelers may have breakfast at a nearby restaurant at a much lower price.
Similarly, airlines oer in-ight beverage service. Business travelers would be more likely
to purchase a beverage during the ight, while leisure travelers may consider bringing their
beverage with them on board rather than purchasing if the airline charges for it. For such
ancillary services, our results indicate that unbundling is more likely to be optimal for
hotels with higher proportions of business travelers (e.g., luxury and upscale hotels) than
hotels with lower proportions of business travelers (e.g., economy and budget hotels), and
it is more likely to be optimal for airlines with lower proportions of business travelers (e.g.,
low-cost airlines) than airlines with higher proportions of business travelers (e.g., legacy
airlines). The current industry practice is that luxury hotels usually charge for breakfast
and economy hotels usually oer breakfast for free. According to the 2012 Lodging Survey
by American Hotel & Lodging Association, the percentages of hotels in dierent tiers
charging for breakfast are: luxury hotels (67%), upscale hotels (33%), midprice hotels
(14%), economy hotels (8%), budget hotels (15%). However, in the airline industry, it is
the low-cost airlines (e.g., Spirit and Frontier) that charge for in-ight beverages.
For airlines, the checked baggage service should involve a negative correlation between
consumers' main service valuations and ancillary service valuations, because business trav-
elers are less likely to check bags than leisure travelers (Schaal 2014). Thus, our results
indicate that unbundling is more likely to be optimal for airlines with higher percent-
ages of business travelers. In practice, legacy airlines charge for checked bags. Primarily
serving leisure travelers, Southwest Airlines does not charge for the rst two bags. (Some
low-cost airlines have switched to a dierent pricing scheme for the ancillary service with
late-payment penalty and started to charge for bags, e.g., Spirit and Frontier. We discuss
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this case in Section 6.) Moreover, as other airlines started to charge for checked bags, con-
sumers with higher baggage needs may switch to Southwest, which results in an overall
increase in Southwest's baggage demand. This would consolidate bundling as Southwest's
optimal strategy. Additionally, as the only major U.S. airline that does not use online travel
agencies to sell ticket, Southwest does not have the incentive to reduce the commissions
paid to the intermediaries by separately charging for the ancillary service. The above three
explanations shed light on the interesting phenomenon in the airline industry that while
most airlines charge for checked bags, Southwest Airlines provides this ancillary service for
free.
Therefore, the contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we study the ancillary service
unbundling problem for rms that use discriminatory pricing of main service. Second, by
contrasting the results to rms that use uniform pricing of main service, we highlight the
fact that the ability to price-discriminate when selling the main service has signicant
impact on a rm's optimal ancillary service strategy and an industry's ancillary service
strategy structure.
2. Literature Review
Although there are not many papers that study ancillary pricing (also called add-on pricing
in some papers), researchers have used both competition models and monopolistic models
to address related issues. Ellison (2005), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Shulman and Geng
(2013), Lin (2015), and Geng and Shulman (2015) study the competition between rms
that sell both a main service and an ancillary service. Papers that study ancillary pricing
under monopolistic settings include Allon et al. (2011) and Fruchter et al. (2011). Allon
et al. (2011) study airlines' baggage pricing problem and nd that the rm should set the
fee for the baggage service at the same level the social planner would. Their result also
suggests that the way in which airlines have implemented baggage fees is more consistent
with attempts to control consumer behavior (i.e., induce consumers to reduce their baggage
needs) than segmenting consumers based on their need to check a bag. Fruchter et al.
(2011) consider a rm that charges the same price to dierent consumer segments and nd
that a free add-on (i.e., bundling the ancillary service) is more protable than oering it for
a fee (i.e., unbundling the ancillary service) if one consumer segment has a high valuation
for the add-on but a relatively low valuation for the primary service, and another segment
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has a higher valuation for the primary service but places no value on the add-on. Our
paper is one of the rst to study the question of whether the rm should unbundle the
ancillary service in the rst place, and our paper is the rst to study this question for both
a rm that charges a uniform main service price and a rm that charges discriminatory
main service prices.
A related stream of literature studies commodity bundling. By analyzing a bundling
setting with two commodities, Adams and Yellen (1976), McAfee et al. (1989), and
Schmalensee (1984) provide the insight that a higher degree of negative correlation between
consumers' valuations for the two commodities makes bundling more protable relative to
unbundled sales. We nd consistent results for a rm that charges a uniform main service
price. However, the results obtained from analyzing a model with a uniform-pricing rm do
not explain the phenomenon we see in the airline industry. Allowing for main service price
discrimination fundamentally changes the previous ndings from the bundling literature.
We nd that whereas it is optimal for a uniform-pricing rm to unbundle the ancillary
service if the consumers that value the main service higher have a high enough likelihood of
purchasing the ancillary service (which indicates a positive correlation between consumers'
valuations for the main service and their valuations for the ancillary service), it is optimal
for a discriminatory-pricing rm to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers that
value the main service higher have a low enough likelihood of purchasing the ancillary
service. Main service price discrimination makes unbundling more (less) likely to be the
optimal ancillary service strategy if consumers' valuations for the main service and the
ancillary service are negatively (positively) correlated. Thus, the correlation eect found by
previous commodity bundling literature becomes very dierent with rm's ability to charge
discriminatory prices. Recently, researchers have explored other research questions related
to bundling, such as bundling with channel interaction (e.g., Bhargava 2012, Chakravarty
et al. 2013, Girju et al. 2013, Cao et al. 2015), bundling information goods (e.g., Bakos
and Brynjolfsson 1999, Geng et al. 2005), bundling vertically dierentiated products (e.g.,
Banciu et al. 2010, Honhon and Pan 2014), cardinality bundling (e.g., Wu et al. 2014),
and the eect of bundling on rm's ordering decision (e.g., Cao et al. 2014). Although
our focus in studying ancillary pricing appears at rst sight to have similarities to issues
studied in the commodity bundling literature, there are signicant dierences between the
two settings. In the setting studied by the commodity bundling literature, each commodity
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can be sold independently (e.g., a retailer that sells toothbrush-toothpaste bundles can
sell toothbrushes and toothpastes as two independent products). In the ancillary pricing
setting, the ancillary service cannot be sold by itself. Consumers can purchase the ancil-
lary service only if they have already purchased the main service, and the purchase of the
ancillary service often occurs later than the purchase of the main service.
There is also a related stream of literature on two-part pricing. Two-part pricing corre-
sponds to the situation where the price of a service is composed of two parts { a lump-sum
fee for the xed part of the service (e.g., cover charge of a bar), and a per-unit charge for the
variable part of the service (e.g., per-drink fee). Pioneered by Oi (1971) and Schmalensee
(1981), the most important issue that the two-part pricing literature has focused on is
when the optimal per-unit price should be above or below the marginal cost of providing
the service. Rosen and Roseneld (1997) nd that whether the optimal per-unit price is
above or below its marginal cost depends on whether the average consumer has higher
or lower demand for the variable part of the service than the marginal consumer. If the
average consumer has higher demand for the variable part of the service than the marginal
consumer, the rm should set the per-unit price above the marginal cost; and vice versa. A
more recent paper, Png and Wang (2010), nds that the result also depends on the correla-
tion between marginal and total benets from the service. The per-unit price should be set
above the marginal cost if marginal and total benets from the service are positively cor-
related; and vice versa. In the ancillary pricing setting, we nd that for a rm that charges
a uniform main service price, the result depends on the underlying consumer valuation
structure (i.e., the correlation between consumers' valuations for the main service and the
ancillary service) in a way that is consistent with the two-part pricing results. Moreover,
we also nd that the result becomes very dierent for a rm that charges discriminatory
main service prices. In this case, if consumers are forward-looking (i.e., they take future
utilities from the ancillary service into consideration when purchasing the service bundle
or main service in advance), the optimal ancillary service price is equal to the marginal
cost. However, if there exists a signicant proportion of myopic consumers (who do not
take future utilities into consideration), the optimal ancillary service price is higher than
the marginal cost.
Therefore, as our literature review indicates, a key dierentiator of our paper is that
we study a discriminatory-pricing rm's optimal unbundling and pricing decisions for the
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ancillary service and how the results are changed compared to a uniform-pricing rm. We
nd that some key ndings from the previous commodity bundling and two-part pricing
literature become very dierent when one considers a discriminatory-pricing rm instead
of a uniform-pricing rm.
3. Model
The rm sells a main service and an ancillary service to two types of consumers that have
dierent valuations for the service. There are H consumers that value the main service at
vH and L consumers that value the main service at vL, where vH > vL. In travel industries,
the H consumers can be considered as business travelers and the L consumers can be
considered as leisure travelers. Throughout the paper, we refer to consumers with main
service valuation vH as high-type consumers, and consumers with main service valuation
vL as low-type consumers. Consumers have uncertain valuations for the ancillary service.
Let uH and uL denote the (uncertain) valuations for the ancillary service of high-type and
low-type consumers, respectively. The ancillary service valuations uH and uL have support
[u; u], where u> 0 and u< 0. We assume u vL (i.e., consumers' valuations for the ancillary
service cannot exceed their valuations for the main service) and vL+ u vH (i.e., any low-
type consumer's valuation for the whole service does not exceed any high-type consumer's
valuation for the whole service). Note that we allow consumers' valuations for the ancillary
service to be negative. A consumer with a negative valuation for the ancillary service will
not use the ancillary service even if it is oered for free. For example, some consumers do
not have bags to check for the ight. Even if the rm does not charge for checked bags,
these consumers still will not use this service. The cumulative distribution functions of uH
and uL are denoted by FH() and FL(), and the probability density functions are denoted
by fH() and fL(). We assume that uH and uL are both uniformly distributed over [0; u]
but have dierent probability densities (we do not assume a specic functional form for
the density over [u;0)). For i = H;L, the probability density function of ui is given by
fi(x) = i=u for 0 x u. Furthermore, dene i = Fi(0) for i=H;L. i measures type-i
consumers' likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service. If H  L, high-type consumers
are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than low-type consumers for any price that
the rm charges for the ancillary service, and consumers' valuations for the main service
and their valuations for the ancillary service exhibit a positive correlation. If H <L, low-
type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than high-type consumers
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for any price that the rm charges for the ancillary service. Thus, in this case, consumers'
valuations for the main service and their valuations for the ancillary service exhibit a
negative correlation. Therefore, the relationship between H and L denes the consumer
valuation structure. As we will see, this relationship is an important factor in determining
rms' optimal ancillary service strategies.
Consumers make the purchasing decision in two stages. First, consumers decide whether
to purchase the service bundle (if the rm bundles), or whether to purchase the main
service (if the rm unbundles) before their valuations for the ancillary service are realized.
Then, after their valuations for the ancillary service are realized, consumers decide whether
to use the ancillary service (if the rm bundles), or whether to purchase the ancillary
service (if the rm unbundles). We assume that consumers are forward-looking, that is,
when making the purchasing decision for the service bundle or main service in advance,
they take future utilities from the ancillary service into consideration. In Section 5.1, we
incorporate myopic consumers (who do not consider future utility from the ancillary service
when making the purchasing decision for the service bundle or main service in advance) for
a discriminatory-pricing rm and study the eect of myopic consumers on rm's optimal
ancillary service strategy.
The rm's key decision is whether to sell the whole service as a bundle, or to unbundle
the ancillary service from the main service and sell the two services separately. We will rst
present results for a rm that charges a uniform price for the main service, and show that
the results are consistent with existing results from the commodity bundling literature.
Then, we will study a rm that charges discriminatory prices for the main service. The
rm's pricing decisions and notations are as follows:
Uniform pricing of main service In the bundling case, the rm charges price pb to both
consumer types for the service bundle. In the unbundling case, the rm charge price pm
for the main service and pa for the ancillary service.
Discriminatory pricing of main service In the bundling case, the rm charges price pbH
to high-type consumers and pbL to low-type consumers for the service bundle. In the
unbundling case, the rm charge prices pmH and pmL to two types of consumers for the
main service and pa for the ancillary service.
Consistent with industry practice, we assume that the rm charges the same ancillary
service price to both types of consumers when the ancillary service is unbundled. For
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example, if a consumer buys a coach ticket, price of in-ight meal does not depend on how
much the consumer has paid for the ticket.
The rm incurs several variable costs serving its consumers. The marginal cost of provid-
ing one unit of main service is cm (0< cm < vL). The marginal cost of providing one unit of
ancillary service is ca (0< ca < u). Moreover, when the rm unbundles the ancillary service,
it incurs an inconvenience cost c() due to consumers' separate purchases of the ancillary
service. The marginal cost is incurred whenever a consumer uses the ancillary service, no
matter whether the ancillary service is bundled or unbundled. For example, the marginal
cost of airline baggage service would include the fuel cost and labor cost (e.g., loading and
unloading the bag). On the other hand, the inconvenience cost is incurred when the ancil-
lary service is purchased separately. If the ancillary service is unbundled, the inconvenience
costs may include the additional labor cost to process the ancillary service payments and
the cost of congestion. For example, passengers paying for carry-on bags at the gate can
delay the boarding process and aect airlines' on-time performances. Moreover, the incon-
venience cost may include rm's potential prot loss because of consumers' loss of goodwill
that is caused by unbundling. By studying consumer perception at a travel resort, Naylor
and Frank (2001) nd that not receiving an all-inclusive package lessens perceptions of
value for rst-time guests. Recently some airlines have been considering charging for in-
ight lavatory use (Pawlowski 2010). One could easily imagine the consumer dissatisfaction
that is brought about if she was asked to pay a fee for lavatory use during the ight. The
cost of unbundling the ancillary/add-on service has also been modeled by other papers,
e.g., Allon et al. (2011) model consumers' costly eort to reduce the likelihood of using the
ancillary service (eort cost is transferred to the rm), Geng and Shulman (2015) model
the cost of unbundling as a potential loss of market share. We dene the inconvenience cost
c() as a function of the number of consumers who purchase the ancillary service in the
unbundling case. We assume c(0) = c0(0) = 0, c0() 0 and c00() 0. In practice, it would
be dicult to signicantly reduce the marginal cost, but it may be possible to signicantly
reduce the inconvenience cost (e.g., by using mechanisms that induce consumers to pay for
the ancillary service in advance). The rm's goal is to choose the optimal strategy (i.e.,
unbundle or not) and price the main service and the ancillary service optimally so that
the total prot from selling the whole service is maximized.
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4. Uniform Pricing of Main Service
In this section, we study the optimal ancillary service strategy for a rm that charges a
uniform price for the main service to both types of consumers. Note that under discrimina-
tory pricing, both types of consumers are served. Under uniform pricing, it may be optimal
to serve only high-type consumers. However, to make a fair comparison, we consider a
uniform-pricing rm that serves both types of consumers, that is, the rm charges the
uniform price at low-type consumers' willingness to pay.
We analyze the bundling case and the unbundling case separately, and then compare
these two cases to obtain the optimal ancillary service strategy. First, consider the bundling
case. For each consumer type i=H;L, given that a consumer purchases the service bundle,
she uses the ancillary service if ui  0 after ui is realized. The rm sells the bundle at price
pb = vL+E(uL)
+ which is low-type consumers' willingness to pay. Note that u vH   vL
ensures that when pb = vL + E(uL)
+, high-type consumers purchase the service bundle
as well, that is, charging at low-type consumers' willingness to pay induces high-type
consumers to purchase as well even if high-type consumers may value the ancillary service
lower. This also holds in the unbundling case. Moreover, the rm incurs marginal costs for
the ancillary service used by consumers who have non-negative valuations for the ancillary
service. Thus, the optimal prot in the bundling case is
b;n = [vL+E(uL)
+  cm](H +L)  ca[H FH(0)+L FL(0)]:
The second subscript of \n" means that the rm does not use price discrimination when
selling the main service.
Second, consider the unbundling case. For each consumer type i = H;L, given that a
consumer purchases the main service, she purchases the ancillary service if ui  pa after ui is
realized. The rm's main service price pm should satisfy pm = vL+E(uL pa)+ which makes
low-type consumers' individual rationality constraint binding. Moreover, the rm incurs
marginal and inconvenience costs from those consumers who purchase the ancillary service
(i.e., those who have ui  pa). The rm's prot maximization problem in the unbundling
case can be reduced to a single-variable optimization problem of the ancillary service price
pa with the following prot function:
u;n(pa) = [vL+E(uL  pa)+  cm](H +L)
+(pa  ca)[H FH(pa)+L FL(pa)]  c(H FH(pa)+L FL(pa)):
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In this section, we assume c000() 0 which holds at least if the inconvenience cost function
is polynomial with non-negative coecients or exponential. This assumption is only needed
to ensure the quasi-concavity of u;n(pa) (hence to guarantee that the optimal solution p

a;n
is unique), and is not needed for the rest of the analysis in this section or the analysis in
the remaining sections of the paper.
Theorem 1. Under uniform pricing of main service, in the unbundling case, if high-
type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than low-type consumers
(i.e., H  L), the optimal ancillary service price is greater than the total marginal cost
of ancillary service (i.e., pa;n  ca + c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))); otherwise, the result
reverses (i.e., if H <L, p

a;n < ca+ c
0(H FH(pa;n)+L FL(p

a;n))).
Theorem 1 states that under uniform pricing of main service, if the rm unbundles,
the optimal ancillary service price should be above the total marginal cost of ancillary
service when high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than
low-type consumers, or equivalently, consumers' valuations for the main service and the
ancillary service are positively correlated. The optimal ancillary service price should be
below the total marginal cost when low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the
ancillary service than high-type consumers, or equivalently, consumers' valuations for the
main service and the ancillary service are negatively correlated. This result is consistent
with the previous ndings in two-part pricing literature (e.g., Rosen and Roseneld 1997,
Png and Wang 2010). Under uniform pricing, the rm only extracts full surplus from
low-type consumers and leaves some surplus from high-type consumers un-captured. A
uniform-pricing rm needs to adjust the main service price and the ancillary service price to
extract more surplus from high-type consumers, while keeping low-type consumers willing
to purchase. If high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than
low-type consumers, to capture more of high-type consumers' surplus from the ancillary
service, the rm should increase the ancillary service price and decrease the main service
price accordingly. On the other hand, if low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the
ancillary service than high-type consumers, the rm should decrease the ancillary service
price and increase the main service price accordingly.
Theorem 2. Under uniform pricing of main service, there exists an increasing threshold
function H;n(L) such that unbundling is more protable than bundling if and only if
H  H;n(L).
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Figure 1 Optimal ancillary service strategy and threshold 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L) under uniform pricing of main service (vH =
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Theorem 2 characterizes the rm's optimal ancillary service strategy under uniform pric-
ing of main service. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal ancillary service strategy by showing
the threshold function H;n(L). Theorem 2 essentially states that it is optimal to unbundle
the ancillary service if high-type consumers' likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service
is high enough and low-type consumers' likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service is
low enough, which is equivalent to requiring that the correlation between consumers' main
service valuations and ancillary service valuations is positive enough. Thus, although the
ancillary service unbundling setting is in nature dierent from the commodity bundling
setting that has been studied by previous literature (i.e., the ancillary service cannot be
sold independently), our result in Theorem 2 for a uniform-pricing rm is consistent with
the commodity bundling literature.
While unbundling the ancillary service gives the rm more exibility and allows the rm
to extract more consumer surplus, it results in higher inconvenience costs. Under uniform
pricing, if high-type consumers are very likely to purchase the ancillary service while low-
type consumers are very unlikely to purchase the ancillary service, bundling the ancillary
service would mean that the rm is leaving too much surplus to high-type consumers. In
this case, the rm should unbundle and charge a high price for the ancillary service to
extract more surplus from high-type consumers. On the other hand, if high-type consumers
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are very unlikely to purchase the ancillary service while low-type consumers are very likely
to purchase the ancillary service, the rm benets from bundling the ancillary service. If
the rm unbundles in this case, it will charge a low price for the ancillary service (Theorem
1), which would not generate much revenue but result in a high inconvenience cost. Overall,
unbundling the ancillary service assists the rm in extracting more surplus from high-
type consumers at the expense of distorting the prices charged to low-type consumers. A
positive enough correlation between consumers' valuations for the main service and the
ancillary service indicates that high-type consumers have signicantly more surplus from
the ancillary service compared to low-type consumers, and hence the rm should capture
it by unbundling the ancillary service.
Theorem 3. Consider two scenarios for a rm using uniform pricing of main service.
In the rst scenario, the demand sizes are H1 and L1. In the second scenario, the demand
sizes are H2 and L2. Suppose H1+L1 = H2+L2 =  and H1 <H2 (hence L1 >L2).
Then, H;n1(L)  H;n2(L) in the region of H  L and H;n1(L) < H;n2(L) in the
region of H <L; H;n1(L) and H;n2(L) intersect on the 45
 line H = L.
Theorem 3 characterizes how the optimal ancillary service strategy is aected by the
rm's demand portfolio in the uniform-pricing case. Figure 1 illustrates how the threshold
function H;n(L) moves as a result of a change in the rm's demand portfolio. If high-
type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than low-type consumers
(i.e., H  L), then increasing the proportion of high-type consumers expands the region
in which unbundling is optimal. If low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the
ancillary service than high-type consumers (i.e., H <L), then increasing the proportion
of high-type consumers shrinks the region in which unbundling is optimal. If consumers'
valuations for the main service and the ancillary service are positively correlated, com-
pared to a rm with fewer high-type consumers, a rm with more high-type consumers has
more incentive to capture the ancillary service surplus from high-type consumers, hence
unbundling is more likely to be the optimal ancillary service strategy. On the other hand,
if consumers' valuations for the main service and the ancillary service are negatively corre-
lated, unbundling is less likely to be the optimal ancillary service strategy for a rm with
more high-type consumers.
For airline checked baggage service, the consumer valuation correlation is negative,
because business travelers who have higher willingness to pay for the tickets actually are
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less likely to have bags to check. In this case, applying Theorem 3 would indicate that
airlines with lower business traveler percentages are more likely to charge for checked bags
compared to airlines with higher business traveler percentages. This is clearly inconsistent
with checked baggage strategies used by airlines. As of 2015, all legacy airlines charge
for checked bags. On the other hand, Southwest Airlines has a much lower percentage
of business travelers compared to legacy airlines, but it does not charge for the rst two
checked bags. One motivation of this paper is to study airlines' ancillary service strategies.
In order to explain the airline industry practice, we need to analyze the case where rms
use price discrimination when selling the main service. Next, we are going to explore how
the results and insights are changed by rm's ability to price-discriminate when selling the
main service.
5. Discriminatory Pricing of Main Service
Now, we consider a rm that can charge discriminatory prices for the service bundle and
main service. For example, in the airline industry, leisure travelers usually plan their trips in
advance and business travelers usually make reservations closer to the travel date. Because
of this demand characteristic, airlines have implemented price discrimination by changing
prices over time (i.e., inter-temporal price discrimination).
We analyze the bundling case and the unbundling case separately, and then compare
these two cases to obtain the optimal ancillary service strategy. In the bundling case,
the rm sells the bundle at prices pbH = vH +E(uH)
+ and pbL = vL+E(uL)
+ to dierent
consumer types. The optimal prot in the bundling case is
b = [vH +E(uH)
+  cm]H + [vL+E(uL)+  cm]L  ca[H FH(0)+L FL(0)]:
Note that if vi+E(ui)
+  cm   ca Fi(0)< 0 for type-i consumers, the rm should not sell
to this consumer type. We assume vL+E(uL)
+  cm  ca FL(0) 0, that is, the rm earns
prots by selling to low-type consumers. Since this condition implies vH +E(uH)
+  cm 
ca FH(0) > 0, the rm also earns prots by selling to high-type consumers. Allowing the
possibility that the rm may want to only sell to some consumer type does not result in
dierent insights regarding the rm's optimal ancillary service strategy. In the unbundling
case, the rm's main service prices charged to dierent consumer types, pmH and pmL,
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should satisfy vH   pmH +E(uH   pa)+ = 0 and vL  pmL+E(uL  pa)+ = 0, respectively.
The prot function in the unbundling case as a function of the ancillary service price pa is
u(pa) = (pmH   cm)H +(pmL  cm)L
+(pa  ca)[H FH(pa)+L FL(pa)]  c(H FH(pa)+L FL(pa))
= [vH +E(uH   pa)+  cm]H + [vL+E(uL  pa)+  cm]L
+(pa  ca)[H FH(pa)+L FL(pa)]  c(H FH(pa)+L FL(pa)):
Theorem 4. (i) Under discriminatory pricing of main service, in the unbundling case,
the optimal ancillary service price is equal to the total marginal cost of ancillary service
(i.e., pa is the solution to p

a = ca+ c
0(H FH(pa)+L FL(p

a))).
(ii) For each consumer type i=H;L, the optimal prices satisfy pmi < p

bi < p

mi+ p

a.
(iii) The price reduction from the optimal bundle price to the optimal main service
price when the rm unbundles is greater for the consumer type with a higher likelihood
of purchasing the ancillary service (i.e., if H  L, pbH   pmH  pbL   pmL; if H < L,
pbH   pmH < pbL  pmL).
Theorem 4(i) characterizes the optimal ancillary service price for a discriminatory-pricing
rm in the unbundling case, which is given by the condition that marginal benet is equal
to total marginal cost. Combining Theorem 4(i) and Theorem 1 which characterizes the
optimal ancillary service price for a uniform-pricing rm, we obtain that compared to the
uniform-pricing case, the rm should charge a lower ancillary service price under discrimi-
natory pricing when high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service
than low-type consumers, or equivalently, consumers' valuations for the main service and
the ancillary service are positively correlated. The rm should charge a higher ancillary
service price under discriminatory pricing when low-type consumers are more likely to
purchase the ancillary service than high-type consumers, or equivalently, consumers' val-
uations for the main service and the ancillary service are negatively correlated. Under
discriminatory pricing, the rm is able to extract full surplus ex ante from both types of
consumers, and does not need to distort the ancillary service price in order to reduce the
un-captured surplus from high-type consumers. Thus, the relationship between the optimal
ancillary service price and the total marginal cost of ancillary service no longer depends
on the correlation of consumers' valuations for the main service and the ancillary service
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as it did in the uniform pricing case. Recall that consumers make forward-looking deci-
sions when purchasing the main service, i.e., they take future utilities from the ancillary
service into consideration. Thus, the rm's optimal ancillary and main service prices are
interrelated. In Section 5.1, we consider a model that also includes myopic consumers who
do not make forward-looking purchasing decisions as an extension. As we will show, when
myopic consumers exist, a discriminatory-pricing rm's optimal ancillary service price can
also be higher than the total marginal cost.
Theorem 4(ii) states that compared to the optimal bundle price, in the unbundling case,
the rm should charge a lower main service price but a higher total price including the
ancillary service to both types of consumers. Moreover, Theorem 4(iii) states that the
consumer type with a higher likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service should see a
more signicant price reduction of the main service when the rm unbundles the ancillary
service. For airlines, since business travelers usually check fewer bags than leisure travelers,
our result indicates that the fare reduction resulting from unbundling the baggage service
should be more signicant for leisure travelers. Our results in Theorem 4(ii) and (iii)
are consistent with the empirical ndings of Brueckner et al. (2014) that after airlines
started charging for baggage fees, leisure fares (as measured by the 25th percentile fare)
fell by one-half to one-third of the baggage fee. Correspondingly, the full trip price for a
passenger paying the baggage fee rose by one-half to two-thirds of the baggage fee. Their
empirical analysis also reveals that the fare impact of imposing a baggage fee is larger at the
lower percentiles (i.e., leisure travelers) and smaller at the higher percentiles (i.e., business
travelers), which is exactly what we nd in Theorem 4(iii). Thus, our model explains the
empirical ndings of Brueckner et al. (2014).
Theorem 5. There exists a decreasing threshold function H(L) such that unbundling
is more protable than bundling if and only if H  H(L).
Next, we derive the optimal ancillary service strategy for a rm using discriminatory
pricing of main service. Theorem 5 states that it is optimal to unbundle the ancillary
service when both types of consumers' likelihoods of purchasing the ancillary service are low
enough. Figure 2 illustrates when unbundling or bundling the ancillary service is optimal
for a discriminatory-pricing rm through the same example used in Figure 1. A lower
likelihood of consumers purchasing the ancillary service keeps the inconvenience cost less
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Figure 2 Optimal ancillary service strategy and threshold H(L) under discriminatory pricing of main service
(vH = 300, vL = 200, u= 50, u= 20, cm = 150, ca = 20, c(x) = 0:5x2; solid curve: H = 20, L = 80;
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signicant. For example, airlines usually charge for the ancillary services that are needed
by very few consumers, such as fees for carrying pets on board. On the other hand, with
a high enough likelihood of consumers purchasing the ancillary service, it is optimal for
the rm to bundle the ancillary service into the main service. For example, since everyone
needs to eat during long international ights, airlines usually oer \free" meals (i.e., meal
price is included in ticket price) for international ights that are long enough (while they
usually do not oer inclusive meals for domestic ights).
Recall that we characterized the regions where unbundling and bundling are optimal
in Theorem 2 and Figure 1 for a rm using uniform pricing of main service. First, under
uniform pricing, unbundling is more protable than bundling if high-type consumers' like-
lihood of purchasing the ancillary service is high enough; whereas under discriminatory
pricing, unbundling is more protable if high-type consumers' likelihood of purchasing
the ancillary service is low enough. Second, the threshold function that separates the
unbundling region and the bundling region is an increasing function under uniform pricing
and a decreasing function under discriminatory pricing. Under discriminatory pricing, by
charging a dierent price to high-type consumers for the service bundle or main service, the
rm can capture the surplus from high-type consumers directly. Thus, whether unbundling
is protable or not no longer depends on the consumer valuation correlation as it did in the
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uniform-pricing case. If the rm is able to price-discriminate when selling the main service,
for unbundling to be the optimal strategy, both consumer types' likelihoods of purchasing
the ancillary service should be low enough.
Theorem 6. Consider two scenarios for a rm using discriminatory pricing of main
service. In the rst scenario, the demand sizes are H1 and L1. In the second scenario, the
demand sizes are H2 and L2. Suppose H1+ L1 = H2+ L2 =  and H1 < H2 (hence
L1 > L2). Then, H1(L) H2(L) in the region of H  L and H1(L)< H2(L) in
the region of H <L; H1(L) and H2(L) intersect on the 45
 line H = L.
Theorem 6 describes how the optimal ancillary service strategy is aected by the rm's
demand portfolio in the discriminatory-pricing case. Figure 2 illustrates how the threshold
function H(L) moves as a result of a change in the rm's demand portfolio. The threshold
function H(L) is less steep for a rm with a higher proportion of high-type consumers
( H(L) spins counterclockwise as the proportion of high-type consumers increases). If
high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than low-type con-
sumers (i.e., H  L), then increasing the proportion of high-type consumers shrinks the
region in which unbundling is optimal. If low-type consumers are more likely to purchase
the ancillary service than high-type consumers (i.e., H <L), then increasing the propor-
tion of high-type consumers expands the region in which unbundling is optimal. Therefore,
if consumers' valuations for the main service and the ancillary service are positively cor-
related, bundling is more likely to be the optimal strategy for a rm with more high-type
consumers than a rm with fewer high-type consumers; if consumers' valuations for the
main service and the ancillary service are negatively correlated, unbundling is more likely
to be the optimal strategy for a rm with more high-type consumers than a rm with
fewer high-type consumers.
5.1. Myopic Consumers
In this section, we investigate the eect of myopic consumers on the rm's optimal ancillary
service strategy. In travel industries, consumers usually purchase the service bundle (when
the rm bundles the ancillary service) or the main service (when the rm unbundles the
ancillary service) in advance. Dierent from forward-looking consumers who take future
utilities from the ancillary service into consideration when purchasing the service bundle
or main service in advance, myopic consumers do not consider future utilities. For some
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ancillary services that do not cost signicant amounts of money, consumers are likely to be
myopic. For example, it would be very unusual that a consumer takes the possible purchase
of a can of coke during the ight (and the price of a can of coke) into consideration when
booking the ticket several months in advance.
To capture the eect of myopic consumers, we now introduce a model with a more
general demand composition comprised of both forward-looking and myopic consumers. We
assume H proportion of high-type consumers and L proportion of low-type consumers are
forward-looking, the other consumers are myopic. In the bundling case, type-i (i=H;L)
myopic consumers are willing to pay vi for the service bundle when making purchasing
decisions in advance, which is lower than forward-looking consumers' willingness to pay,
vi + E(ui)
+. For each consumer type i = H;L, the rm can choose to price the service
bundle at pbi = vi +E(ui)
+ to induce only forward-looking consumers to purchase, or at
pbi = vi to induce both forward-looking and myopic consumers to purchase. Thus, the rm
has four price combinations to choose from: \HH", \HL", \LH", \LL", where the former
notation refers to the price for high-type consumers and the latter refers to the price for
low-type consumers, \H" means pricing high and \L" means pricing low. The resulting
prots are as follows, where we add a subscript \m" to represent the case with myopic
consumers, and use the superscript to represent the price choice of the rm:
HHb;m = [vH +E(uH)
+  cm]HH + [vL+E(uL)+  cm]LL  ca[HH FH(0)+LL FL(0)];
HLb;m = [vH +E(uH)
+  cm]HH +(vL  cm)L  ca[HH FH(0)+L FL(0)];
LHb;m = (vH   cm)H + [vL+E(uL)+  cm]LL  ca[H FH(0)+LL FL(0)];
LLb;m = (vH   cm)H +(vL  cm)L  ca[H FH(0)+L FL(0)]:
The optimal prot in the bundling case is b;m =max(
HH
b;m ;
HL
b;m ;
LH
b;m ;
LL
b;m ).
In the unbundling case, type-i (i=H;L) myopic consumers are willing to pay vi for the
main service when making purchasing decisions in advance, and forward-looking consumers
have a higher willingness to pay, vi +E(ui   pa)+. For each consumer type i=H;L, the
rm can choose to price the main service at pmi = vi+E(ui pa)+ to induce only forward-
looking consumers to purchase, or at pmi = vi to induce both forward-looking and myopic
consumers to purchase, hence also leading to four price combinations. The resulting prots
are as follows, as functions of the ancillary service price:
HHu;m(pa) = [vH +E(uH   pa)+  cm]HH + [vL+E(uL  pa)+  cm]LL
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+(pa  ca)[HH FH(pa)+LL FL(pa)]  c(HH FH(pa)+LL FL(pa));
HLu;m(pa) = [vH +E(uH   pa)+  cm]HH +(vL  cm)L
+(pa  ca)[HH FH(pa)+L FL(pa)]  c(HH FH(pa)+L FL(pa));
LHu;m(pa) = (vH   cm)H + [vL+E(uL  pa)+  cm]LL
+(pa  ca)[H FH(pa)+LL FL(pa)]  c(H FH(pa)+LL FL(pa));
LLu;m(pa) = (vH   cm)H +(vL  cm)L
+(pa  ca)[H FH(pa)+L FL(pa)]  c(H FH(pa)+L FL(pa)):
The optimal prot in the unbundling case is u;m = max(
HH
u;m(p

a);
HL
u;m(p

a);
LH
u;m(p

a);
LLu;m(p

a)).
Theorem 7. In the unbundling case, the optimal ancillary service price is strictly higher
than the total marginal cost if the rm sells to both forward-looking and myopic consumers;
the optimal ancillary service price is equal to the total marginal cost if the rm only sells
to forward-looking consumers.
In the unbundling case, Theorem 7 states that as long as the rm sells to myopic
consumers (either high-type or low-type), it should price the ancillary service above the
marginal cost. In fact, we can characterize the condition for the rm to price the ancillary
service above or equal to the marginal cost. It can be shown that there exist two threshold
functions, ~H(L) and ~L(H), such that 

u;m =
HH
u;m (hence the optimal ancillary service
price is equal to the marginal cost) if H > ~H(L) and L > ~L(H), and 

u;m 6=HHu;m
(hence the optimal ancillary service price is above the marginal cost) otherwise. Unlike
forward-looking consumers, myopic consumers' decisions on purchasing the main service
and purchasing the ancillary service are made independently. Thus, when selling to myopic
consumers, the rm no longer wants to decrease the ancillary service price to the marginal
cost so that it could extract more consumer surplus overall by increasing the main service
price accordingly. In reality, \small-item" ancillary services are usually priced well-above
their marginal costs, e.g., a can of coke is priced more than 10 times the cost of it if ordered
during the ight. Since consumers are myopic, the rm extracts high margins from selling
the ancillary service.
Theorem 8. (i) If unbundling is more protable when all consumers are forward-looking
(i.e., H = L = 1), then it is more protable for all H and L.
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(ii) If bundling is more protable when all consumers are forward-looking (i.e., H =
L = 1), then there exist two thresholds ^H , ^L and a decreasing threshold function H(L)
such that when H  ^H , L  ^L, and H  H(L), unbundling is more protable.
Now we compare the unbundling prot to the bundling prot when some of the rm's
consumers are myopic. Theorem 8 states that as the rm's proportion of myopic consumers
increases, it may become optimal for the rm to switch from bundling to unbundling
but not the other way around. If it is optimal to unbundle the ancillary service when all
consumers are forward-looking, then it is also optimal to unbundle the ancillary service
with any proportion of myopic consumers. If it is optimal to bundle the ancillary service
when all consumers are forward-looking, we nd a sucient condition such that the rm
should actually unbundle the ancillary service when the proportion of myopic consumers is
signicant enough (i.e., H and L are small enough). When selling to myopic consumers,
the rm does not capture any consumer surplus from the ancillary service in the bundling
case, because myopic consumers' utilities from the ancillary service do not aect their
willingness to pay for the service bundle. However, by unbundling the ancillary service,
the rm is able to capture myopic consumers' surplus from the ancillary service, because
the rm induces myopic consumers to actually pay for the ancillary service. Thus, the
existence of myopic consumers may switch the rm's optimal ancillary service strategy
from bundling to unbundling but not the other way around.
Theorem 9. The optimal prots from bundling and unbundling are both increasing in
the proportion of forward-looking consumers, H and L.
Theorem 9 states that regardless of whether the rm bundles or unbundles the ancillary
service, its prot becomes higher when more consumers are forward-looking. For a rm
that sells an ancillary service in addition to a main service, having more forward-looking
consumers is benecial because by accounting for future utilities from the ancillary ser-
vice, forward-looking consumers are willing to pay more for the service bundle and main
service than myopic consumers when purchasing in advance. Thus, the rm benets from
providing guidance to consumers for their ancillary service needs and making the informa-
tion of the ancillary services easily accessible to consumers. Notice that forward-looking
(strategic) consumers play a dierent role in the ancillary service pricing setting than in
the markdown pricing setting which has been extensively studied by previous literature.
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Although forward-looking consumers have been perceived as harmful to rms that salvage
product leftovers at the end of the selling season, they actually benet rms that manage
the sales of a main service and an ancillary service simultaneously.
6. Comparison and Industry Insights
So far, we have analyzed the ancillary service unbundling problem for a rm using uniform
pricing of main service and a rm using discriminatory pricing of main service separately.
In this section, we compare the results for the two types of rms and discuss insights for
industry practice. We rst compare the cases where unbundling/bundling is the optimal
ancillary service strategy under uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. Then, we com-
pare the way that the optimal ancillary service strategy is aected by the rm's demand
portfolio under uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. Finally, we use the results to
explain the ancillary service strategies used in the airline industry and hotel industry. We
discuss why airlines and hotels exhibit dierent patterns of ancillary service strategies, and
why Southwest Airlines chooses not to charge for checked bags while most other airlines
do.
Theorem 10. (i) If high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary ser-
vice than low-type consumers (i.e., H  L), when unbundling is more protable under
discriminatory pricing, it is also more protable under uniform pricing (i.e., when u b ,
we also have u;n b;n).
(ii) If low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than high-type
consumers (i.e., H < L), when unbundling is more protable under uniform pricing, it
is also more protable under discriminatory pricing (i.e., when u;n b;n, we also have
u b).
Theorem 10 compares the optimal ancillary service strategy for a uniform-pricing rm
(Theorem 2) and a price-discriminating rm (Theorem 5). If high-type consumers are more
likely to purchase the ancillary service than low-type consumers, or equivalently, if con-
sumers' valuations for the main service and the ancillary service are positively correlated,
unbundling is less likely to be the optimal ancillary service strategy for a discriminatory-
pricing rm than a uniform-pricing rm. If low-type consumers are more likely to purchase
the ancillary service than high-type consumers, or equivalently, if consumers' valuations
for the main service and the ancillary service are negatively correlated, unbundling is more
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Figure 3 Comparison of optimal ancillary service strategies under uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing of
main service (vH = 300, vL = 200, u= 50, u= 20, cm = 150, ca = 20, c(x) = 0:5x2, H = 20, L = 80;
Region A: unbundle in both cases; Region B: bundle in both cases; Region C: unbundle under uniform
pricing, bundle under discriminatory pricing; Region D: bundle under uniform pricing, unbundle under
discriminatory pricing)
likely to be the optimal ancillary service strategy for a discriminatory-pricing rm than
a uniform-pricing rm. Figure 3 illustrates the result in Theorem 10 by plotting together
the threshold functions under uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing, using the same
example in Figures 1 and 2. As Figure 3 shows, when consumers' valuations are positively
correlated (i.e., in the region above the dotted line), the unbundling region is smaller for
a discriminatory-pricing rm; when consumers' valuations are negatively correlated (i.e.,
in the region below the dotted line), the unbundling region is larger for a discriminatory-
pricing rm.
Therefore, when a rm switches from uniform pricing to discriminatory pricing for the
main service, it should re-evaluate its policy for the ancillary service. For a rm managing
an ancillary service that involves a positive consumer valuation correlation, a shift from
unbundling to bundling may be needed; for a rm managing an ancillary service that
involves a negative consumer valuation correlation, a shift from bundling to unbundling
may be needed. Firms in several industries, such as sporting event organizers and hotels,
are currently trying to enforce inter-temporal price discrimination. Along with the adoption
of main service price discrimination, it is important for these rms to identify which of
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their consumer segments values the ancillary service more and adjust the strategy for the
ancillary service accordingly.
In previous sections, we have shown how the optimal ancillary service strategy is aected
by the rm's demand portfolio under uniform pricing (Theorem 3) and discriminatory pric-
ing (Theorem 6). If we compare Theorem 3 to Theorem 6, we see that the result is exactly
reversed. Again, the fundamental reason is that the ancillary service price plays a dierent
role under uniform pricing than it does under discriminatory pricing. A uniform-pricing
rm uses the ancillary service price as a lever to capture more of the high-type consumers'
surplus that is not captured by the uniform main service price, while a discriminatory-
pricing rm does not do so. Table 1 summarizes the ndings from this paper about the
eect of rm's demand portfolio on its optimal ancillary service strategy. It characterizes
how the optimal ancillary service strategies in an industry is jointly determined by rms'
use of main service price discrimination as well as consumers' valuation structure.
Uniform pricing Discriminatory pricing
Positive consumer Higher H%) unbundle Higher H%) bundle
valuation correlation Lower H%) bundle Lower H%) unbundle
Negative consumer Higher H%) bundle Higher H%) unbundle
valuation correlation Lower H%) unbundle Lower H%) bundle
Table 1 Comparison of the eects of rm's demand portfolio on the optimal ancillary service strategy in the
uniform-pricing case and in the discriminatory-pricing case
Dierent from the airline industry where it is very common that consumers in dierent
segments pay dierent prices for the same type of seats, discriminatory pricing of room
rates is much less used in the hotel industry. Moreover, the most common ancillary ser-
vices oered by hotels (e.g., breakfast, in-room internet connection) would usually involve
a positive correlation between consumers' main service valuations and ancillary service
valuations. Higher-valuation consumers are more likely to purchase these ancillary services
from the hotel, whereas lower-valuation consumers may seek cheaper outside options (e.g.,
having breakfast in a nearby fast-food store at a lower price). Thus, Theorem 3 and Table
1 indicate that unbundling is more likely to be optimal for hotels with higher proportions
of higher-valuation consumers (e.g., luxury hotels) than hotels with lower proportions of
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higher-valuation consumers (e.g., economy hotels). The current industry practice is that
luxury hotels usually charge for such ancillary services and economy hotels usually oer
them for free. Our result here provides an explanation for this phenomenon.
Next, consider airline baggage policies. Since business travelers are less likely to check
bags than leisure travelers (i.e., H <L), Theorem 6 and Table 1 indicate that unbundling
is more likely to be optimal for airlines with higher proportions of business travelers than
airlines with lower proportions of business travelers. As of 2015, legacy airlines charge for
checked bags; the airline that stands rm on not charging for checked bags is Southwest
(Southwest does not charge for the rst or second checked bag) which primarily serves
leisure travelers (some low-cost airlines, including Spirit and Frontier, unbundle the bag-
gage service under a dierent pricing structure; we discuss this case later in this section).
Additionally, after some rms unbundle the ancillary service, consumers with higher needs
for the ancillary service may switch to the rms that are still bundling the ancillary service
for their lower total prices, and consumers without ancillary service needs may switch to
the unbundling rms for their lower main service prices. This would result in an increase in
consumers' likelihood of using the ancillary service for the bundling rms, and a decrease
in consumers' likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service for the unbundling rms. Thus,
following from Theorem 5, rms' dierentiated ancillary service strategies will be consol-
idated. This type of consumer self-selection regarding airlines' checked bag fees (which is
empirically supported by Nicolae et al. 2013) provides another reason for Southwest to
bundle the checked bags. Moreover, the bundling rms can increase the bundle price due
to the increased consumer valuations for the ancillary service. For example, Henrickson
and Scott (2012) consider the top 150 domestic routes from 2007 to 2009, and nd that a
one dollar increase in baggage fees reduced airline ticket prices on the baggage-fee-charging
airlines by $0:24 and increased Southwest Airlines' ticket prices on routes in which they
compete with baggage-fee-charging airlines by $0:73.
Another reason for Southwest to bundle the checked baggage service is its non-
dependency on intermediary sales channels such as online travel agencies (OTAs). When
the rm bundles the ancillary service into the main service, it has to pay commissions to
the OTA for the whole service price. By unbundling the ancillary service, the rm only
pays commissions to the OTA for the main service price and still collects the full price of
the ancillary service. Thus, unbundling the ancillary service helps rms earn more revenues
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back from OTAs, which is what a lot of travel rms are trying to achieve nowadays. For a
rm that is facing a higher OTA commission or is more dependent on OTAs (i.e., OTAs
account for a larger proportion of the rm's sales), unbundling the ancillary service is more
valuable. In fact, one can easily analyze a model extension with intermediary and show
that as the OTA's commission increases, or as consumers shift from purchasing directly
from the rm to purchasing from the OTA, unbundling the ancillary service becomes more
protable relative to bundling. Formally, consider a model extension where H proportion
of high-type consumers and L proportion of low-type consumers purchase directly from
the rm, the other consumers purchase from the intermediaries. The rm pays a commis-
sion of  (which is dened as a percentage of the revenue collected by the OTA) to the OTA
for each unit of sale. It can be proved that the dierence between the optimal unbundling
prot and the optimal bundling prot is increasing in the intermediary commission  , and
decreasing in the proportion of direct sales, H and L.
In order to benet from unbundling, the rm needs to reduce the inconvenience cost.
One way to reduce the inconvenience cost is to induce consumers to pay for the ancillary
service in advance. Spirit and Frontier Airlines have recently started to unbundle the
baggage service while resorting to a new pricing structure for the ancillary service with
late-payment penalty. Spirit and Frontier are now charging baggage fees contingent on
when consumers pay for their bags. The later a consumer pays for the bag, the higher
the fee is. For example, Spirit charges $100 for any bag (checked and carry-on) that is
paid for at the gate, which is three to four times higher than the baggage fees other
airlines normally charge and Spirit's advance baggage fee itself. The following explanation
has been given by Spirit's spokesperson: \The fee is intentionally set high to encourage
customers to reserve their bags in advance, and it is meant to deter customers from waiting
until they get to the boarding gate. When customers wait until the boarding gate, this
delays the boarding process for everyone." (Brown 2012) Because the new pricing structure
signicantly reduces the inconvenience cost, Spirit and Frontier also charge for carry-on
bags. Being recognized as the airline with the lowest fares, Spirit may not lose too many
consumers even if its consumers are dissatised with the high late-payment penalty, because
price-sensitive consumers are not very likely to get even lower ticket prices elsewhere if they
refuse to accept the new baggage policy and pay in advance. So far, Spirit's implementation
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of the new baggage policy appears to be a success. However, resorting to a pricing structure
with the late-payment penalty may be riskier for other airlines.
Dierent from checked baggage service, other ancillary services oered by airlines such
as in-ight services (e.g., beverages, snacks) would usually involve a positive correlation
between consumers' valuations for the main service and the ancillary service. Same as the
ancillary services oered by hotels, higher-valuation consumers are more likely to purchase
these ancillary services while lower-valuation consumers can seek outside options (e.g.,
bringing their own snacks or simply not having snacks during the ight). Thus, Theorem
6 and Table 1 indicate that airlines with higher percentages of business travelers are less
likely to charge for these ancillary services compared to airlines with lower percentages
of business travelers. As of 2015, all legacy airlines oer this service as complementary.
In general, low-cost airlines have embraced the concept of a la carte pricing for in-ight
services to a greater extent than legacy airlines.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we study whether and when a rm should unbundle the ancillary service
from the main service and separately charge for the ancillary service for two types of rms:
rms that charge a uniform main service price and rms that charge discriminatory main
service prices. We nd that the ability to price-discriminate when selling the main service
plays an important role in the decision of unbundling the ancillary service or not. While the
results for a uniform-pricing rm are consistent with the commodity bundling literature,
some classic ndings from the previous commodity bundling literature and two-part pricing
literature actually do not carry through to the discriminatory-pricing case. Thus, our paper
oers unique contributions to the existing literature. We nd that whereas it is optimal for
a uniform-pricing rm to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers that value the
main service higher have a high enough likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service, it is
optimal for a discriminatory-pricing rm to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers
that value the main service higher have a low enough likelihood of purchasing the ancillary
service. Firm's ability to price-discriminate when selling the main service makes unbundling
more (less) likely to be the optimal ancillary service strategy when consumers' valuations
for the main service and the ancillary service are negatively (positively) correlated. This
result highlights the need to re-evaluate the ancillary service strategy to rms that are
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adopting main service price discrimination, and provides the insight that the direction of
change in the ancillary service strategy depends on the underlying consumer valuation
structure.
This paper also provides the insight that rms' use of main service price discrimination
and consumers' valuation structure jointly determine the structure of optimal ancillary
service policies in an industry. For similar ancillary services that involve the same type of
consumer valuation structure and are oered by dierent industries (e.g., hotels' breakfast
service and airlines' in-ight beverage service), which rms in the industry are more likely
to unbundle the ancillary service could dier signicantly depending on the industry's use
of main service price discrimination.
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Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Taking derivatives of the prot function yields
du;n
dpa
= H [ FH(pa)  FL(pa)] + [c0(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))  (pa   ca)][HfH(pa) + LfL(pa)];
d2u;n
dp2a
=  2HfH(pa) + HfL(pa)  LfL(pa)  c00(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))[HfH(pa) + LfL(pa)]2;
d3u;n
dp3a
= c000(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))[HfH(pa) + LfL(pa)]3:
If H  L, it is easy to see that d
2u;n
dp2a
< 0, so u;n is concave. If H < L, since
d3u;n
dp3a
 0,
du;n
dpa
is convex. Moreover,
du;n
dpa

pa=u
=  (u  ca)[HfH(pa) + LfL(pa)] < 0:
Thus,
du;n
dpa
can cross the zero line at most once, from positive to negative, which means u;n is
quasi-concave.
Therefore, pa;n = inff0 < pa < u : H [ FH(pa)   FL(pa)] + [c0(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))   (pa  
ca)][HfH(pa)+LfL(pa)]  0g. Then, if H  L, we have pa;n  ca+c0(H FH(pa;n)+L FL(pa;n));
if H < L, we have p

a;n < ca + c
0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n)).
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Consider u;n b;n as a function of H . First consider the case of pa;n = 0. pa;n = 0 occurs
when
du;n
dpa

pa=0
= H(H   L) + [c0(HH + LL) + ca]  HH+LLu  0, which requires H is
small enough (if pa;n = 0 ever occurs). When pa;n = 0, we have u;n   b;n =  c(HH + LL)
which is negative and decreasing in H .
Second, consider the case of pa;n > 0 which occurs when H is large enough. Taking derivatives
of the optimal prot functions with respective to H yields:
@u;n
@H
= [pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))]H 
u  pa;n
u
;
@b;n
@H
=  caH ;
1
where the derivative of u;n follows from the Envelope Theorem. Thus,
@(u;n  b;n)
@H
= H

[pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))] 
u  pa;n
u
+ ca

: (1)
Recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that the rst-order condition in the uniform pricing case is
pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n)) = H [
FH(p

a;n)  FL(pa;n)]
HfH(pa;n)+LfL(pa;n)
. Thus, if H  L, pa;n   ca  
c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))  0, and hence
@(u;n b;n)
@H
> 0. If H < L, by using the rst-order
condition, we can equivalently write
@(u;n b;n)
@H
as
@(u;n  b;n)
@H
=
H
HH + LL

H  H   L
u
 (u  pa;n)2 + ca(HH + LL)

:
If pa;n is increasing in H , then H  H Lu  (u pa;n)2+ ca(HH +LL) is increasing in H , and
hence
@(u;n b;n)
@H
is rst decreasing then increasing in H . We now show that p

a;n is increasing in
H . By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the rst-order condition
du;n
dpa
= 0, we obtain
dpa;n
dH
=  
@
@H
  du;n
dpa

pa=pa;n
@
@pa
  du;n
dpa

pa=pa;n
=  
@
@H
  du;n
dpa

pa=pa;n
d2u;n
dp2a

pa=pa;n
: (2)
The numerator of (2) is
@
@H

du;n
dpa

pa=pa;n
= H 
u  pa;n
u
+ c00(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(p

a;n)) 
H(u  pa;n)(HH + LL)
u2
 [pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))] 
H
u
:
Since H < L, the rst-order condition implies that p

a;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n)) < 0.
Then, since c() is convex, we know that @@H
  du;n
dpa

pa=pa;n
> 0. Moreover, in the proof of
Theorem 1, we already know that
du;n
dpa
can only cross the zero line from positive to negative.
Thus,
d2u;n
dp2a

pa=pa;n
< 0, and hence
dpa;n
dH
> 0.
So far, we have obtained that 1) for small H (if p

a;n = 0 ever occurs), 

u;n   b;n is negative
and decreasing in H ; 2) for large H (i.e., H  L), u;n b;n is increasing in H ; 3) for medium
H (i.e., H < L and p

a;n > 0), 

u;n b;n is rst decreasing then increasing in H . Thus, overall,
u;n   b;n is quasi-convex (i.e., rst decreasing then increasing) in H . If pa;n = 0 occurs for
small H , 

u;n   b;n rst decreases from a negative value and then becomes increasing in H ,
thus it is negative for small H and positive for large H . If p

a;n = 0 never occurs, we may have
two scenarios. First, if u;n   b;n is increasing in H at H = 0, then it is always increasing in
H , and hence 

u;n   b;n can only be negative for small H and positive for large H . Second,
if u;n   b;n is decreasing in H at H = 0, we now show that we must have u;n   b;n < 0 at
H = 0 in this case, so that 

u;n   b;n is negative for small H and positive for large H . At
2
H = 0, we have
u;n  b;n =  H 
L
2u
 pa;n(2u  pa;n) + L 
L
2u
 pa;n(2ca   pa;n)  c(L FL(pa;n)):
@(u;n b;n)
@H

H=0
< 0 can be simplied to  H  Lu    caLL(u pa;n)2 . Thus, we have
u;n  b;n   
caLL
2(u  pa;n)2
 pa;n(2u  pa;n) + L 
L
2u
 pa;n(2ca   pa;n)  c(L FL(pa;n))
=
LL
2u
 pa;n 

 ca 
2u  pa;n
u  pa;n
 u
u  pa;n
+ (2ca   pa;n)

  c(L FL(pa;n))
<  LL
2u
 (pa;n)2   c(L FL(pa;n))
< 0;
where the rst inequality follows from using  H  Lu    caLL(u pa;n)2 and the second inequality follows
from
2u pa;n
u pa;n > 2 and
u
u pa;n > 1. Therefore, combining all cases analyzed above, we obtain that
there exists a threshold function H;n(L) such that 

u;n  b;n if and only if H  H;n(L).
Next, we show that H;n(L) is an increasing function. By applying the Implicit Function
Theorem to the equation u;n  b;n = 0 which denes H;n(L), we have
dH;n
dL
=  
@(u;n b;n)
@L

H=H;n(L)
@(u;n b;n)
@H

H=H;n(L)
:
We have shown that u;n   b;n can only cross the zero line from negative to positive, thus
@(u;n b;n)
@H

H=H;n(L)
> 0. It remains to show that
@(u;n b;n)
@L

H=H;n(L)
 0. Taking deriva-
tives of the optimal prot functions with respect to L yields:
@u;n
@L
=
(u  pa;n)2
2u
 (H + L) + [pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))]L 
u  pa;n
u
;
@b;n
@L
=
u
2
 (H + L)  caH ;
where the derivative of u;n follows from the Envelope Theorem. Thus,
@(u;n  b;n)
@L
=
pa;n(pa;n   2u)
2u
(H+L)+L

[pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))] 
u  pa;n
u
+ ca

:
At H = H;n(L), we have 

u;n = 

b;n which is equivalent to the following equation after rear-
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ranging terms:
L
2u
 pa;n(pa;n   2u)(H + L) =  (pa;n   ca)(HH + LL) 
u  pa;n
u
+c(H FH(p

a;n) + L
FL(p

a;n))  ca(HH + LL):
By using c(x)  c0(x)x, we obtain from the above equation that at H = H;n(L),
L
2u
 pa;n(pa;n   2u)(H + L)   [pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))](HH + LL) 
u  pa;n
u
 ca(HH + LL):
By using the above inequality, at H = H;n(L), we have
@(u;n  b;n)
@L
  [pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))] 
HH + LL
L
 u  p

a;n
u
 ca  HH + LL
L
+L

[pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))] 
u  pa;n
u
+ ca

=  H  H
L


[pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))] 
u  pa;n
u
+ ca

: (3)
Thus, by comparing (1) and (3), we obtain that
@(u;n b;n)
@L

H=H;n(L)
 @(

u;n b;n)
@H

H=H;n(L)
  H;n(L)L   0. Therefore, H;n(L) is increasing in L.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. When we increasing H and decreasing L such that H + L = , applying the Implicit
Function Theorem to the equation u;n  b;n = 0 yields
dH;n
dH
=  
@(u;n b;n)
@H
  @(

u;n b;n)
@L
@(u;n b;n)
@ H
=  
( H;n   L)
n
[pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))]  u p

a;n
u + ca
o
H
n
[pa;n   ca   c0(H FH(pa;n) + L FL(pa;n))]  u p

a;n
u + ca
o
=
L   H;n
H
:
Thus, H;n(L) is decreasing in H when H;n(L)  L and increasing in H when H;n(L) < L.
Also, note that when H;n(L) = L, H;n(L) does not change with H if we keep H + L = .
Thus, H;n(L) intersects at the same point on H = L when we change H and keep H+L = .
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Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. (i) The rst-order derivative of u(pa) is
du
dpa
= [c0(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))  (pa   ca)][HfH(pa) + LfL(pa)]:
Since c0(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))   (pa   ca) is decreasing in pa, u(pa) is quasi-concave in pa.
Thus, the optimal ancillary service price is the solution to the rst-order condition, i.e., pa =
ca + c
0(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa)).
(ii) Since pa > 0, for i = H;L, we have pmi = vi + E(ui   pa)+ < vi + E(ui)+ = pbi. Since
pmi + p

a = vi + E[max(ui; p

a)], we have p

bi < p

mi + p

a.
(iii) Since pbi   pmi = E(ui)+   E(ui   pa)+ =
R pa
0
Fi(x) dx for i = H;L, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Since E(ui x)+ = i2u(u x)2 for i = H;L, taking derivatives of the optimal prot functions
with respect to H and L yields
@u
@H
=
(u  pa)2
2u
 H + (pa   ca)H 
u  pa
u
  c0(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))H 
u  pa
u
=
(u  pa)2
2u
 H ;
@b
@H
=
 u
2
  ca

H ;
@u
@L
=
(u  pa)2
2u
 L + (pa   ca)L 
u  pa
u
  c0(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))L 
u  pa
u
=
(u  pa)2
2u
 L;
@b
@L
=
 u
2
  ca

L;
where the derivation for derivatives of u follows from the Envelope Theorem and the rst-order
condition. Thus,
@(u  b)
@H
=

(u  pa)2
2u
  u
2
+ ca

H ;
@(u  b)
@L
=

(u  pa)2
2u
  u
2
+ ca

L:
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By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the rst-order condition, we obtain
@pa
@H
=
c00(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))H
u pa
u
1 + c00(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))[HfH(pa) + LfL(pa)]
> 0;
@pa
@L
=
c00(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))L
u pa
u
1 + c00(H FH(pa) + L FL(pa))[HfH(pa) + LfL(pa)]
> 0:
Thus pa is increasing in H and L. Then, since
@(u b )
@H
is decreasing in pa, it is decreasing in
H , hence 

u  b is concave in H . Similarly, u  b is concave in L.
When H = L = 0, 

u   b = 0; also, pa = ca, hence
@(u b )
@H

H=L=0
= c
2
a
2u  H > 0,
@(u b )
@L

H=L=0
= c
2
a
2u  L > 0. Thus, when L = 0, there exists a threshold ^H such that
u   b  0 when H  ^H , and u   b < 0 when H > ^H . Similarly, when H = 0, there
exists a threshold ^L such that 

u  b  0 when L  ^L, and u  b < 0 when L > ^L.
Next, notice that
@(u b )
@H
and
@(u b )
@L
have the same sign. If L > ^L, we have
@(u b )
@L

H=0
<
0, hence we also have
@(u b )
@H

H=0
< 0. Then, since u   b is concave in H , we have
@(u b )
@H
< 0 for any L > ^L. Thus, if L > ^L, since 

u   b < 0 when H = 0, we have
u   b < 0 for all H . Similarly, if H > ^H , u   b < 0 for all L. Thus, the solution to
u   b = 0 must satisfy H  ^H and L  ^L. For any L, because u   b is concave in
H and 

u   b  0 at H = 0, u   b crosses the zero line once from positive to negative
when varying H . Let H(L) denote this threshold. We must have
@(u b )
@H

H=H(L)
< 0 and
@(u b )
@L

H=H(L)
< 0. Thus, by applying the Implicit Function Theorem to u  b = 0 which
is the equation that denes H(L), we know that H(L) is decreasing in L. Note that H(L)
intersects with the H -axis and L-axis at ^H and ^L, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. When we increase H and decrease L such that H+L = , applying the Implicit Function
Theorem to the equation u  b = 0 yields
dH
dH
=  
@(u b )
@H
  @(u b )@L
@(u b )
@ H
=  
H
h
(u pa)2
2u   u2 + ca
i
  L
h
(u pa)2
2u   u2 + ca
i
H
h
(u pa)2
2u   u2 + ca
i
=
L   H
H
:
Thus, H(L) is decreasing in H when H(L)  L and increasing in H when H(L) < L.
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Also, note that when H(L) = L, H(L) does not change with H if we keep H + L = .
Thus, H(L) intersects at the same point on H = L when we change H and keep H +L = .
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. For each of the four cases (\HH", \HL", \LH", \LL"), by using the same approach in the
proof of Theorem 4, we can prove the quasi-concavity of the prot function, and hence the optimal
ancillary service price is given by the rst-order condition as follows:
 \HH" case: The optimal ancillary service price pHHa;m is the solution to pHHa;m = ca+c0(HH FH(pHHa;m )+
LL FL(p
HH
a;m )).
 \HL" case: The optimal ancillary service price pHLa;m is the solution to pHLa;m = ca+c0(HH FH(pHLa;m )+
L FL(p
HL
a;m )) +
L FL(p
HL
a;m )
HHfH(pHLa;m )+LfL(pHLa;m )
.
 \LH" case: The optimal ancillary service price pLHa;m is the solution to pLHa;m = ca+c0(H FH(pLHa;m )+
LL FL(p
LH
a;m )) +
H FH(p
LH
a;m )
HfH(pLHa;m )+LLfL(pLHa;m )
.
 \LL" case: The optimal ancillary service price pLLa;m is the solution to pLLa;m = ca+c0(H FH(pLLa;m )+
L FL(p
LL
a;m )) +
H FH(p
LL
a;m )+L
FL(p
LL
a;m )
HfH(pLLa;m )+LfL(pLLa;m )
.
The result then follows.
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. (i) We will show that when u  b , the following four results hold: 1) HHu;m  HHb;m , 2)
HLu;m  HLb;m , 3) LHu;m  LHb;m , 4) LLu;m  LLb;m .
 HHu;m  HHb;m : Notice that HHu;m(pa) is equal to u(pa) with H replaced by HH and
L replaced by LL. By following the same approach in the proof of Theorem 5, we can
obtain that there exists a decreasing threshold function H(L) such that unbundling is more
protable than bundling if and only if H  H(L). Thus, when u  b , we also have
u  b with smaller H and L. This means that when HHu;m  HHb;m with H = L = 1,
we have HHu;m  HHb;m for all H and L.
 HLu;m  HLb;m : Our discussion above indicates that by replacing H with HH , we also have
u  b , i.e.,
[vH + E(uH   pa)+   cm]HH + [vL + E(uL   pa)+   cm]L
+(pa   ca)[HH FH(pa) + L FL(pa)]  c(HH FH(pa) + L FL(pa))
 [vH + E(uH)+   cm]HH + [vL + E(uL)+   cm]L   ca[HH FH(0) + L FL(0)]:
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Note that in the above inequality, pa is the optimal ancillary service price in the basic model
with H replaced by HH . Next, subtracting the left-hand side of the above inequality by
E(uL pa)+L and subtracting the right-hand side by a larger amount E(uL)+L, we obtain
[vH +E(uH   pa)+   cm]HH + (vL   cm)L
+(pa   ca)[HH FH(pa) + L FL(pa)]  c(HH FH(pa) + L FL(pa))
> [vH +E(uH)
+   cm]HH + (vL   cm)L   ca[HH FH(0) + L FL(0)];
which is equivalent to HLu;m(p

a) > 
HL
b;m . Since 
HL
u;m  HLu;m(pa), we have HLu;m > HLb;m .
 LHu;m  LHb;m : This follows from the same approach that we used above to prove HLu;m 
HLb;m .
 LLu;m  LLb;m : This is true because LLu;m > LLu;m(u) = vHH + vLL > LLb;m . Note that
LLu;m  LLb;m is actually always true and is not dependent on u  b .
Therefore, combining these four results, we conclude that when u  b , u;m  b;m for all H
and L.
(ii) In Part (i), we have proved that LLu;m  LLb;m always holds. Thus, when u;m = LLu;m and
b;m = 
LL
b;m , we must have 

u;m  b;m. We rst consider the unbundling case and characterize
when u;m = LLu;m . u;m = LLu;m requires 1) LLu;m  HHu;m , 2) LLu;m  HLu;m , 3) LLu;m  LHu;m .
 Condition for LLu;m  HHu;m : When H = L = 0, LLu;m > HHu;m trivially because HHu;m = 0.
When H = L = 1,
LLu;m = (vH   cm)H + (vL   cm)L
+(pLLa;m   ca)[H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pLLa;m )]  c(H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pLLa;m ))
< [vH + E(uH   pLLa;m )  cm]H + [vL + E(uL   pLLa;m )  cm]L
+(pLLa;m   ca)[H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pLLa;m )]  c(H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pLLa;m ))
= HHu;m(p
LL
a;m )
 HHu;m :
Moreover, we know from the proof of Theorem 9 that
d(LLu;m HHu;m )
dH
< 0 and
d(LLu;m HHu;m )
dL
<
0. Thus, there exists a threshold function H;u(L) such that 
LL
u;m  HHu;m when H 
H;u(L) Moreover, by applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the equation 
LL
u;m  
HHu;m = 0 which denes H;u(L), we obtain that H;u(L) is a decreasing function.
 Condition for LLu;m  HLu;m : When H = 0, HLu;m = (vL cm)L+(pHLa;m  ca)L FL(pHLa;m ) 
c(L FL(p
HL
a;m )) which is independent of H . Consider 
LL
u;m as a function of H . At H = 0, we
have LLu;m = HLu;m . Moreover, by using the Envelope Theorem and the rst-order condition
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of LLu;m(pa), we have
dLLu;m
dH
= vH   cm + (pLLa;m   ca) FH(pLLa;m )  c0(H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pHLa;m )) FH(pLLa;m )
= vH   cm + FH(pLLa;m ) 
H FH(p
LL
a;m ) + L FL(p
LL
a;m )
HfH(pLLa;m ) + LfL(pLLa;m )
> 0:
Thus, when H = 0, 
LL
u;m > 
HH
u;m for any positive H . When H = 1,
LLu;m = (vH   cm)H + (vL   cm)L
+(pLLa;m   ca)[H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pLLa;m )]  c(H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pLLa;m ))
< [vH + E(uH   pLLa;m )  cm]H + (vL   cm)L
+(pLLa;m   ca)[H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pLLa;m )]  c(H FH(pLLa;m ) + L FL(pLLa;m ))
= HLu;m(p
LL
a;m )
 HLu;m :
Moreover, we know from the proof of Theorem 9 that
d(LLu;m HLu;m )
dH
< 0. Thus, there exists
a threshold ^H;u such that 
LL
u;m  HLu;m when H  ^H;u.
 Condition for LLu;m  LHu;m : By using the same approach of deriving the condition for
LLu;m  HLu;m , we can obtain that there exists a threshold ^L;u such that LLu;m  LHu;m when
L  ^L;u.
Therefore, we have obtained that u;m = LLu;m when H  ^H;u, L  ^L;u, and H  H;u(L).
Next, consider the bundling case. b;m = 
LL
b;m requires 1) 
LL
b;m  HHb;m , 2) LLb;m  HLb;m , 3)
LLb;m  LHb;m . We have the following:
 LLb;m  HHb;m is equivalent to
H  (vH   cm)H + (vL   cm)L   ca[H
FH(0) + L FL(0)]
[vH + E(uH)+   cm   ca FH(0)]H
  [vL +E(uL)
+   cm   ca FL(0)]LL
[vH + E(uH)+   cm   ca FH(0)]H
def
== H;b(L):
 LLb;m  HLb;m is equivalent to
H  vH   cm   ca
FH(0)
vH + E(uH)+   cm   ca FH(0)
def
== ^H;b:
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 LLb;m  LHb;m is equivalent to
L  vL   cm   ca
FL(0)
vL + E(uL)+   cm   ca FL(0)
def
== ^L;b:
Therefore, b;m = 
LL
b;m when H  ^H;b, L  ^L;b, and H  H;b(L).
Finally, take H(L) = min(H;u(L); H;b(L)), ^H = min(^H;u; ^H;b), ^L = min(^L;u; ^L;b).
Thus, when H  ^H , L  ^L, and H  H(L), we have u;m = LLu;m and b;m = LLb;m , and
hence u;m  b;m.
Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. First, consider the monotonicity of b;m. We need to show that each 
ij
b;m (i; j = H;L) has
a non-negative derivative with respect to H and L. This is true because
@HHb;m
@H
=
@HLb;m
@H
= [vH + E(uH)
+   cm]H   caH FH(0) > 0;
@LHb;m
@H
=
@LLb;m
@H
= 0;
@HHb;m
@L
=
@LHb;m
@L
= [vL + E(uL)
+   cm]L   caL FL(0)  0;
@HLb;m
@L
=
@LLb;m
@L
= 0:
Second, consider the monotonicity of u;m. We have
@HHu;m
@H
= [vH + E(uH   pHHa;m )+   cm]H
+(pHHa;m   ca)H FH(pHHa;m )  c0(HH FH(pHHa;m ) + LL FL(pHHa;m ))H FH(pHHa;m )
= [vH + E(uH   pHHa;m )+   cm]H
> 0;
where the rst equality follows by using the Envelope Theorem and the second equality follows
by using the rst-order condition of HHu;m(pa). Similarly,
@HHu;m
@L
> 0. By applying the Envelope
Theorem and the rst-order condition of HLu;m(pa), we have
@HLu;m
@H
= [vH + E(uH   pHLa;m )+   cm]H
+(pHLa;m   ca)H FH(pHLa;m )  c0(HH FH(pHLa;m ) + L FL(pHLa;m ))H FH(pHLa;m )
= [vH + E(uH   pHLa;m )+   cm]H + H FH(pHLa;m ) 
L FL(p
HL
a;m )
HHfH(pHLa;m ) + LfL(pHLa;m )
> 0:
Similarly,
@LHu;m
@L
> 0. Additionally, we have
@LHu;m
@H
=
@LLu;m
@H
=
@HLu;m
@L
=
@LLu;m
@L
= 0. Therefore,
u;m is also increasing in H and L.
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Proof. (i) If H  L, we have
u;n  u  u;n(pa) u
=  (vH   vL)H   [E(uH   pa)+   E(uL   pa)+]H
=  (vH   vL)H   H
Z u
pa
[ FH(x)  FL(x)] dx
  (vH   vL)H   H
Z u
0
[ FH(x)  FL(x)] dx
=  (vH   vL)H   [E(uH)+   E(uL)+]H
= b;n  b :
Rearranging terms in the inequality obtained above yields u;n   b;n  u   b . Thus, when
u  b , we also have u;n  b;n.
(ii) If H < L, we have
u;n  u < u;n  u(pa;n)
=  (vH   vL)H + [E(uL   pa;n)+   E(uH   pa;n)+]H
  (vH   vL)H + [E(uL)+   E(uH)+]H
= b;n  b ;
where the second inequality follows from the same approach used in Part (i). Thus, we have
u;n  b;n < u  b ; when u;n  b;n, we also have u  b .
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